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Many Americans become uneasy when others try to impose a reli-
gious orientation on government. The assumption that church and state
are separate is so pervasive that attempts to associate the two are viewed
suspiciously. However, American law and government have never been
separate from religion, and probably never will be. While church and
state may be separate, religion and state are not. In particular, religion
and jurisprudence are so related that to understand American legal his-
tory, one must understand American religion. This Article will focus on a
significant time in Connecticut history that exposed how jurisprudence
remained subject to the influences of religion even after the supposed
separation of church and state. The Article is not designed to be an ex-
haustive exposition on the religious character of American jurisprudence,
but it is an experiment created to introduce new analytical categories of
interpretation.
In attempting to discern the effect that religion had in the develop-
ment of American jurisprudence, modern scholars have measured reli-
gious influence by either tallying the number of religious laws enacted by
the legislature, or by dismissing such studies by saying that a law was
enacted simply because of the power of the church. By concentrating on
these end products, however, these academics failed to realize that reli-
gion is a way of life, not simply an ethical and liturgical code. For exam-
t This article is part of a book being published by McFarland (1986).
* B.A., Government, Notre Dame; M.A., Notre Dame; J.D., Northwestern.
JURISPRUDENCE
ple, William Nelson noted that the most significant development in
America from 1760 to 1830 was the eradication of established state
churches and the emergence of new religious diversity.' His analysis was
based on an exhaustive compilation of "religious" laws, specifically crimi-
nal laws, defamation, laws protecting religion, and personal morality laws.
Although Nelson realized the strong religious nature of early American
law, his analysis stopped short of really understanding the religious/legal
nexus. But it was not, as Nelson thought, that the influence of religion
declined after 1830, rather it was that the language and nature of religion
changed so that the force of its influence could not be measured by its
traditional, institutional, and political manifestations. The church and
Puritan legislation were merely convenient and visible benchmarks of a
far deeper, more pervasive religious ethos. In order to achieve a proper
understanding of what the church and religious legislation were about,
one must realize the total religious nature of the individuals dominating
the churches and the legislatures. In short, modern analysis focusing on
laws and churches completely misses the spiritual nature of American
jurisprudence.
Even when scholars have attempted to integrate notions of religion
and law, usually at least one of the disciplines has been misunderstood.
For instance, Lon Fuller attempted to distinguish between the morality of
duty and aspiration, so that he could develop base-line notions of what
characteristics law must have in order to be moral. While the distinction
between duty and aspiration is common, in articulating the distinction,
Fuller blithely asserted that the Ten Commandments and the Old Testa-
ment merely were concerned with the "basic requirements of social liv-
ing. , 2 In other words, the theology of the Decalogue, couched in "Thou
shalt not" terms is exemplary of moral duty, not of aspiration to a per-
fected being. Such an assertion ignores several very strong theological in-
terpretations such as one presented by Martin Luther, who said that the
Old Testament was not merely a set of rules, but a way of life whose
requirements were so impossible to reach that God sent Jesus Christ to
earth to relieve men. The Decalogue was not simply the "basic require-
ments" but a call for men to learn what good was and to teach them that
however noble they may be, they could not reach that good.8 One may
disagree with Luther's understanding of the Old Testament, but Fuller's
acceptance of the popular idea that the Decalogue was minimalistic is
symptomatic of a far greater difficulty inherent in interweaving religious
and legal notions; namely, that shorthand classifications lead to inaccu-
W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 2 (1975).
L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 6 (1964).
3 See MARTIN LUTHER, THE FREEDOM OF A CHRISTIAN 282 (W.A. Lambert trans.), rev. in H.
GRIMES, MARTIN LUTHER: THREE TREATISES (1943).
30 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1985
rate analysis.
There are two ways to escape this difficulty. A writer may become
either fully versed in both disciplines, a task that often would fail to ap-
preciate an individual's particular religion, or may look explicitly at what
religion means to a particular person who also was involved in law
making.
One scholar who has begun to do some of this latter type of analysis
is Stephen Presser. Presser described his approach as belonging to the
"heroic school" of legal history, a school that focuses on individual men
and examines their jurisprudential contributions as a product of their
personalities. Presser recognizes that "man is after more than mere eco-
nomic survival, and they (heroic school historians) study legal man as he
searches for spiritual as well as temporal salvation."' Presser applied this
methodology particularly effectively in an article on New Jersey Federal
Judge John Thompson Nixon.5 Presser interpreted part of Nixon's juris-
prudence as an outgrowth of his intense and active Presbyterian faith,
particularly Nixon's acceptance of the doctrine of predestination. While a
religious analysis of a jurist's faith must be developed beyond that of a
single doctrine, Presser is correct in identifying the usefulness of religion
in understanding jurisprudence.
This Article attempts to broaden the term "religious" beyond the
limits that modern legal historians have imposed upon it. Religion cannot
be understood simply by looking at ethics, church membership, or politi-
cal alliances of church and state. Religion must be understood in its truer
form, as a way of life. In its broadest and simplest form, this Article asks
what was the judge's way of life. Because of the nature of Connecticut
prior to 1860, this question resolves itself into a question of the content of
the judge's Christianity, and how that way of life shaped his
jurisprudence.
The second theme is to show that Connecticut was an unfolding nat-
ural law tradition. To understand this, one needs to understand some-
thing about the political form of Christian natural law. Jacques Ellul, in
The Theological Foundation of Law' outlines four states in the develop-
ment and erosion of natural law. He states that in its origin, law is an
expression of the will of God as formulated by priests and that is sanc-
tioned by some type of ritual. The precepts of the religion are presented
in juridical garb. In this stage, there is absolutely no distinction between
law and religion.
' Presser, "Legal History" or the History of Law: A Primer on Bringing the Law's Past
Into the Present, 35 VAND. L. REV. 849, 866 (1982).
1 Presser, "Judicial Ajax:" John Thompson and the Federal Courts of New Jersey in the
Late Nineteenth Century, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 423 (1981).
J . ELLUL, THE THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF LAW 5 (1960).
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Gradually, however, the law becomes secular as the religious ele-
ments differentiate from the juridical and moral law. The state becomes
somewhat different from religion. Ellul says that at this point, natural law
begins. The natural law is established by custom and legislation which is
independent of religious power. The natural law spontaneously arises
from the common sentiment of the people; it is not dictated by a power
such as the church or the state. Law is an expression of the people's con-
sciences. In other words, law is part of a way of life in both stages one and
two, but in stage one, the law is identified with the traditional and insti-
tutional manifestations of religion: churches and priests. In stage two the
way of life is broadened beyond the traditional and institutional; it is reli-
gion in a new language. In the third stage, the natural law is articulated
as part of a theory. At this moment, man ceases to be spontaneously
within the law, but instead places himself outside of the law to explain it
rationally. The law is then the object of interpretation rather than simply
an accepted way of life. A key element of this stage is that the jurist seeks
to organize and systematize the law in a rational fashion.
Connecticut was poised between stages two and three. Prior to 1790
in Connecticut, law was simply the Puritan way of life. The law was es-
tablished by custom and legislation as a result of political, economic, and
moral factors of the time. The established state church did not dictate
the law, but the Puritan faith was so ingrained in each person, that it was
impossible for one to place himself outside of the Puritan way of life.
However, this way of life was stable because of the unity of the people in
the Puritan faith, a unity that was shattered by the Great Awakening of
1740. Those revivals drove conservative Congregationalists to the Meth-
odist and Baptist churches and moderate Congregationalists to the Epis-
copal church, resulting in the diversification of group conscientiousness.
Without a unified conscience, Connecticut law was pushed toward stage
three, the systematic elaboration of the law. Connecticut only moved to-
ward stage three however, it did not fully enter it.
Connecticut judges such as Zephania Swift and Tapping Reeve strove
to articulate the law rationally and later justices followed their system-
atizing approach. Despite this rational technique, jurisprudence remained
within the bounds of Christian thought. Religious preoccupation re-
mained a way of life, and Connecticut was still guided by natural law as it
was interpreted in a systematically Calvinist manner. Thus the second
theme of the Article is that Connecticut moved from a natural law society
toward a scientific law society because of the religious diversity spawned
by the Great Awakening.
While the focus of this Article relates to Ellul's second and third
stages as applied to Connecticut, his fourth stage is enlightening for a
general consideration of American legal history. In stage four, the state
itself settles the problem of correct interpretation of the law by positively
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articulating the law. In this stage, central principles are pronounced, and
juridical technique becomes increasingly precise and rational. Law hard-
ens into rigid classifications since it is removed f1rom societal spontaneity.
Law loses its normative value and simply becomes a game. As a game,
juridical technique can be influenced by whomever has power, usually a
manipulation working through the state. When natural law has thus been
negated, the people will not follow the law spontaneously, since the new
law simply is imposed and is not a way of life. This manipulative law
needs to be enforced by the state. Attempts to revive the natural law are
doomed to failure because natural law arises; it cannot be artificially or
consciously revived.
7
The malleability of this new law is consonant with much of the eco-
nomic legal analysis written by Morton Horowitz and the radical trans-
formationist school of economic legal analysis as well as by members of
the Wisconsin school of economic legal analysis.8 Once law becomes ra-
tional, the forces of economics increase in power and influence. Hence,
while the modern emphasis upon economic analysis of nineteenth century
law is justified, it is important to remember that economics also was
changing the perspective and language of religion. Religion adapted to the
changing culture and thereby contributed to, if not defined primarily the
substance of, scientific jurisprudence.
For this Article, the primary way to understand the religious nature
is to study two Chief Justices of the Connecticut Supreme Court of Er-
rors. Zephania Swift and Tapping Reeve were giants in transforming Con-
necticut jurisprudence and, not so coincidentally, they served as Chief
Justices during Connecticut's crucial decade of 1810 to 1820. Neither ju-
rist hesitated to express his theology. Before turning to each one, how-
ever, a short description of Connecticut is needed to frame the context in
which these judges worked.
I HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A) Early Connecticut History
The first settlers in Connecticut were Puritans who emigrated from
Massachusetts in 1636. Within a short time, Connecticut adopted the first
modern constitution in the United States, the Connecticut Fundamental
Orders. Reverend Thomas Hooker, the most prominent personality in
Connecticut, provided the substantive theory for the 1639 Constitution in
a sermon given at the General Court on May 31, 1638.'
7 Id. at 31-35.
I For an excellent systemization of schools of modern legal historical perspectives, see
Presser, supra note 4, at 849.
* A JUDICIAL AND Civn. HIsToRY OF CONNECTICUT 9 (D. Loomis & J. Calhoun ed. 1895). [Her-
JURISPRUDENCE
Hooker's sermon contained three main doctrines. First, it was God's
decision to allow people to choose their ruling magistrates. Second, the
enfranchised voters were to elect the magistrates according to what the
people believed to be the will of God. Voting was not based on what the
candidate could do for the individual voter, but on what the candidate
could do for God. Third, the people were to restrain the power of the
incumbent magistrates. Election was not authority for the monarchy or
episcopacy. Underlying Hooker's doctrines was his explicit belief that
people would be more inclined to love officers and obey these officials if
the people freely elected them.'0
Hooker's sermon illuminates the theological character of Connecticut
civilization. Hooker, like John Calvin, stressed that God was not an aloof,
disinterested being, but was an active participant in government. The en-
tire political process was focused on maximizing God's glory. This govern-
mental focus on God accentuated the need for all of society to have a
consistent understanding of God's nature. As long as Connecticut enjoyed
theological homogeneity, their theocentric government functioned effec-
tively. This orientation also left Connecticut vulnerable to religious diver-
sity, since diverse notions of God would directly attack the entire govern-
mental structure.
The Fundamental Orders created a simple, but effective government
that remained intact until the Connecticut Constitution of 1818. Written
by a close friend of Hooker, Roger Ludlow, the Fundamental Orders pro-
vided for the election of six magistrates, who with a governor were to rule
according to the will of God. Towns elected individual representatives
who assisted these seven men and together they were known as the Gen-
eral Court, which possessed all judicial, legislative, and executive author-
ity. In 1662, England recognized the provisions of the Fundamental Or-
ders when it used them as the basis for granting Connecticut a charter
that would remain Connecticut's official government document until the
1818 Constitution.
The Connecticut magistrates quickly recognized the necessity of del-
egating powers to inferior courts. By 1638, the General Court was ap-
pointing "assistants" to the judically-oriented courts and made the local
county courts extensions of its authority." The lower courts mediated be-
tween persons, hearing civil cases that mainly dealt with property and
probate issues. Debt actions were popular because they were inexpensive
and because the lower court was often the only available forum in which
the parties could bind their agreements. The lower courts also attracted a
inafter cited as CIVIL HISTORY IN CONNECTICUT].
'0 JONES, CONGREGATIONAL COMMONWEALTH, CONNECTICUIT, 1636-1662, at 70-71 (1981).
" See E. GOODWIN, THE MAGISTRACY REDISCOVERED: CONNECTICUT 1636-1818, at 37-45
(1981).
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great number of personal morality cases, which came in two groups. The
first group consisted of prosecutions of offenses such as drunkenness, vul-
garity, and sexual crimes. The second group concerned such allegations
against personal character as slander and defamation."'
There were several good reasons for the numerous cases."3 First, the
court was a God-given method of dispute resolution. The Puritans would
not have hesitated to turn to a divine blessing like the court to settle
societal problems. Second, "personal morality" cases were not simply a
secular affront, but a crucial religious issue. A person's piety was a sign of
predestined salvific election. A slanderous remark directed against a per-
son's reputation could call one's piety into doubt if the charge was left
unmet. Thus, a slanderous statement actually could challenge the reality
of one's eternal destiny. Such an offense was not a question of personal
affrontery, but of one's eternal self-understanding. Thus, legal courts
originally were based upon and concerned with issues that did not differ-
entiate between secularity and sacredness.
B) Religious Development
In the one hundred years following the adoption of the Fundamental
Orders, Puritan piety diminished. When this weakened piety was con-
fronted with the increasing political, economic, and social complexity of
the mid-1700s, the Great Awakening resulted. The Awakening, which ex-
ploded in 1740, was a religious revivalist movement that spread through-
out most of the thirteen colonies and was particularly intense in New
England. It shattered the religious unity of Connecticut. In its wake, the
Great Awakening left a religiously diverse population that would not tol-
erate the presence of an established church and that challenged the reli-
gious basis for the governance and jurisprudence of Connecticut. Before
the Awakening, Connecticut was almost entirely Congregational; by 1776,
one-third of the population had left the Congregational church."'
The revivals were a Calvinist reassertion of the sovereignty of God
and the depravity of man. The revivals fiercely objected to any diminu-
tion of man's duty to conduct a pious life and to any attempt to concep-
tualize man as enlightened. They emphasized the emotional conversion
experience instead of professions of faith. 5 They were thought to be
caused solely by an outpouring of God's spirit, so that the more emotional
one became at a revival, the more deeply one had been touched by the
" Id. at 39-49.
's Goodwin states that the numerous cases illustrate that there was a troublesome class of
people in Connecticut and that the Puritans themselves had disagreements.
14 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES, 410 (1975).
'5 C. GOEN, REvIVALsM AND SEPARATIsM IN NEw ENGLAND 13 (1962).
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Holy Spirit." They emphasized the participation of laity and the volun-
tary performance of moral acts. Attempts to enforce morality were dis-
paraged. 17 Those who separated from the Congregational church dis-
trusted the Puritans because the Puritans were trying to enforce a diluted
piety.
Because of the Great Awakening, there was no longer the religious
homogeneity that had been the backbone of Connecticut government
since its founding. Many moderate Congregationalists, fearing that their
church might become ultraconservative, became Anglican and thus
shaped the Anglican church into a Calvinist mold, while Baptist and
Methodist congregations swelled, particularly in the rural areas."9 Thus, it
became much harder to view the membefs of the Assembly and the
judges as expositors of God's will, since the methods of discovering God's
will had changed. Diversity forced political and judicial institutions to
find new methods of gaining and maintaining consensus and legitimacy.
Connecticut moved toward a new state, in which jurists rationally at-
tempted to synthesize and systematize the old natural law. That new ap-
proach was the rational, scientific approach of Tapping Reeve and
Zephania Swift.
C) Connecticut History 1790 - 1820
The years 1790 to 1820 were years of political revolution and reli-
gious turbulence. Significant political forces triggered the adoption of a
new constitution in 1818 replacing the Charter of 1662 as the governing
document of the state. There were two basic reasons for the adoption of a
new constitution, both were based on religious motives.
First, there was the desire for religious liberty among Episcopals,
Methodists, and Baptists, who hated the certificate. The certificate al-
lowed one to worship in his own church without having to pay taxes that
supported the established Congregational Church. To receive the certifi-
cate, one had to apply directly to the legislature. The certificate allowed
the Federalists/Congregationalists to claim that Connecticut enjoyed reli-
gious freedom, but the dissenters found the tedious requirement of apply-
ing to the legislature an obnoxious limitation on religious liberty. 9 The
politically astute state Republicans made the disestablishment of the
Congregational Church and religious liberty primary party platforms and
thereby snared the political allegiances of most of these religious
"I E. GAUSTAD, THE GREAT AWAKENING 16.
1 Id. at 110.
'6 Id. at 117-120.
R. PURCELL, CONNECTICUT IN TRANSITION: 1775-1818, at 61-62 (1963).
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dissenters.20
The second cause for the drive for the new constitution was the influ-
ence of the French Revolution. The Revolution stimulated the existing
roots of religious discontent and also encouraged deism. The Great Awak-
ening already had caused a deep religious split in Connecticut, and in the
French-Indian War and the American Revolution, theologically vulnera-
ble American soldiers were exposed to European deism and rationalism.
Rationalism spurred a desire for Connecticut to erect a government with
a new constitution. The deistic movement in the United States was
spearheaded by Joseph Priestly, Ethan Allen, Thomas Paine, and
Thomas Jefferson.
When the Connecticut Republicans criticized the Connecticut clergy,
the Federalists quickly branded them as Jeffersonian, amoral deists. To
the Federalist mind, any attack of the Congregational clergy was an at-
tack on God. The Connecticut Federalists did not understand that the
religious dissenters were Republican because that was the only way they
could achieve religious freedom. The degree to which the political strug-
gle was religiously-based is revealed by Timothy Dwight's characteriza-
tion of the Republicans as sabbath-breakers, profane swearers, attenders
of amusements and balls, drunkards and gamblers.21
While several issues dominated the political scene from 1810-1820,
the final incident that led to the Constitution was the problem of the
distribution of war funds. Fourteen thousand dollars were owed to Con-
necticut for its share of expenses of the War of 1812. In 1816, Connecticut
received and distributed the money to the religious societies: one-third
went to the Congregational Church, one-seventh went to the Bishop's
Fund (Episcopal), one-twelfth went to the Methodist Church, one-eighth
went to the Baptist Church, one-seventh went to Yale, and the remainder
went into the state treasury.22 The allocation angered everybody. The
Congregationalists felt that they deserved more, and the other sects felt
that the Congregationalists had been unfairly benefitted. This inflamed
the religious pluralism problem even more.
The 1817 election focused on church-state separation, religious tests
for office, secret handling of state finances, taxation, and the Hartford
Convention." None of these issues were particularly favorable to the Fed-
eralists. The result was that the Republicans who also were (significantly)
known as the Tolerationists, won the 1817 gubernatorial election by six
"0 See id. at 217.
" See C. KELLER, THE SECOND GREAT AWAKENING IN CONNECTICUT, 13-24 (1968).
2' 3 R. PARKER, COURTS AND LAWYERS OF NEW ENGLAND 627 (1971).
's The Hartford Convention was held in 1814. It almost led to the secession of Connecticut
and Massachusetts from the Union and was quickly branded a traitorous gathering.
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hundred votes, and won control of the General Assembly. 4
The 1818 Convention generally was composed of religiously tolerant
delegates. It was a non-partisan meeting since the Federalists went along
with the Republican reforms. The three major innovations in the new
constitution were that religious toleration was granted to all Christians,
the government was divided into three branches, and the Congregational
Church was disestablished.2 5 While the political resolution of religious
pluralism was the constitution, Connecticut turned to a familiar move-
ment, the revival, for the religious solution.
From 1800-1830, Connecticut experienced an almost continuous state
of revivalism that emphasized humanitarian activity. While Calvinism
had always encouraged ethical responsibility, these revivals differed in
that the activity was geared toward the development of the social good.
The revivals cut across denominational lines and sparked formation of
missionary societies, Bible, tract, and educational societies, Sunday
schools, and other societies for moral reform." The Connecticut Bible So-
ciety was founded in 1811 to send bibles to the western frontier. The
Connecticut Society for the Promotion of Good Morals was founded to
further "moral" sermons and inveighed against interpermanency. The
Domestic Mission Society for Connecticut and Vicinity was founded to
build up "waste places" and the New England Tract Society established a
school for the deaf and dumb.27
The theological focus of the revivals, as in Calvinism and the Great
Awakening, was the grace and power of God, and the need for human
submission to the will of God. These revivals, however, added two signifi-
cant innovative thoughts to Calvinism: the value of the individual, and
the social responsibility of the church. The church was no longer to serve
merely as a place for the gathering of the elect, rather it was to be con-
cerned about the common good. The individual was no longer depraved,
rather he had some intrinsic worth. This new shift deemphasized the doc-
trines of election and predestination; man had responsibilities and control
over his ultimate destiny.28 Man was no longer simply a pawn in super-
natural hands.
The humanitarian emphasis was able to cut through denominational
divisions. It was easier to build consensus about the rights of sending Bi-
bles to the west than it was to determine the nature of original sin. The
emphasis on humanitarianism entailed a higher understanding of the na-
24 R. PURCELL, supra note 19, at 220-21.
See id. at 243, 252-53.
26 See C. KELLER, supra note 21, at 3.
See id. at 111, 145; R. PURCELL, supra note 19, at 32-33.
26 W. SWEET, RELIGION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CULTURE: 1765-1840, at 200
(1952).
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ture of man. This "improved" man, however, was still sinful and in need
of God's grace, so that while the revivalist theology viewed man more
sympathetically, he was not considered to be a perfectable being.
Rationalism also broadened consensus. Instead of following Puritan
law, all law was subject to examination, explanation, and systemization.
By 1789, Connecticut was using written reports of judicial opinions, the
first American state to do so.29 The written reports required the judge to
base his opinions on logical argument instead of notions of customs and
experience. The natural law was no longer sufficient to hold consensus,
and rational law took its place. This new emphasis on logical systemiza-
tion and argument was pioneered by Tapping Reeve and Zephania Swift.
II THE JUSTICE
A) Tapping Reeve
Tapping Reeve's contribution to Connecticut jurisprudence cannot
be overstated. He established America's first formal law school in
Litchfield, Connecticut. He published some of the earliest legal treatises
on American law, and was Chief Justice of the Connecticut Supreme
Court. He consistently attempted to articulate the law rationally and sys-
tematically. His articulation was a direct outgrowth of his theology, for he
felt that the law was systemitized religious truth.
Reeve's jurisprudence can best be grasped by understanding as much
of the man as is possible. First, his way of life will be examined, i.e. his
lifestyle, his activities, his politics, and his theological orientation. His le-
gal theory will be presented while simultaneously noting how that theory
has theological orientation.
1) Reeve's Way of Life
Quite simply, Tapping Reeve's entire existence revolved around his
religion:
Reeve's public and private life was under the domination of religion, a reli-
gion which was strengthened by the most sublime and comprehensive view
of God, His character, law, gospel, and government in all its unerring recti-
tude and great results .... Reeve chose to live a religion which was ardent,
but not given to open enthusiasm. The characteristic traits of his piety were
ardous, constancy, humility, and gratitude.30
Reeve's social humanitarianism was extensive. He was the President
of the Connecticut Bible Society, whose purpose it was to send Bibles to
the western frontier. He was vice-president of The Connecticut Society
19 CiWL HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT, supra note 9, at 143.
30 E. SWANSON, TAPPING REEYE AMERICAN LAW PIONEER 24 (1981).
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for the Promotion of Good Morals, which was founded to further "moral"
sermons and which inveighed against intemperancy. He was a close friend
of the most prominent revivalist of the early nineteenth century, Lyman
Beecher, and enthusiastically embraced Beecher's calls for greater hu-
manitarian activities. In his personal life he was self-effacing, humble,
and loyal. His personality was such that one of his law students wrote
that "no instructor was ever more generally loved by his pupils."31 Yet
Reeve's humility did not entail any wavering about the rightness of his
faith or the wrongness of other faiths, as shown by his willingness to
stand against members of his own family. His lifestyle was rather antipo-
dal to that of his cosmopolitan brother-in-law, Aaron Burr, and Reeve
spurned all of the former vice-president's attempts to contact him.3" It
also has been suggested that Reeve's fierce piety was a reaction to the
debacle of his father, a Presbyterian minister, who was dismissed by his
congregation for perpetual drunkenness. 3
Whatever the reasons were, there is no doubt that Reeve clearly saw
a difference between the righteousness of his faith and the darkness of
the faith of others. Reeve said that those who were not members of his
faith were "fellow sinners [who were] groping in the more than midnight
gloom of heathen darkness. 3 4 Reeve, an ardent Federalist, denigrated the
integrity of the Republicans by saying that they were not serious about
their ideological beliefs, (meaning the desire for religious liberty) but
merely were politically ambitious. 5 To Reeve, the Republican movement
was an effort to prepare Connecticut for a revolution that would knife the
heart of religious, governmental, and social being.36
How could Reeve humbly live a life as the exemplary do-gooder and
at the same time stubbornly reject the ways of life variant to his own,
even to the point of completely misunderstanding Methodist, Episcopal,
and Baptist desires for religious liberty? Politics and ethics, like laws, are
important indicia of orientation, but politics and ethics understood as
acts often do not illuminate the deeper, underlying forces that orient life.
Thus, just as to understand the law we must delve into the way of life of
the justice instead of confining ourselves to laws and traditional institu-
tions of religion, so for the justice we must dig beneath politics and ethics
to understand the way of life.
Tapping Reeve was not an innovative theologian, nor is there any
31 Boardman, Sketches of the Early Lights of the Litchfield Bar in P. KILBOURNE, THE
BENCH AND BAR OF LITCHFIELD COUNTY, 1709-1909 at 42.
3 M. LOMASK, AARON BURR: THE CONSPIRACY AND YEARS OF EXILE, 1805-1836, at 371 (1982).
" E. SWANSON, supra note 30, at 8, 24.
34 Letter from Tapping Reeve to Sally Adams, quoted in E. SWANSON, supra note 30, at 24.
8 T. REEVE, THE SIXTH OF AUGUST 4 (1968).
"Id.
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hint that he ever desired or claimed to be one. Yet his theological state-
ments, activities, and relationships tie him to three of the greatest theolo-
gians in New England history. He lived in the same town and was a
friend of Lyman Beecher, he was allied with Yale President Timothy
Dwight, and he was married to the granddaughter of Johnathan Edwards.
These three men had enormous influence in Connecticut life from 1740
through 1830 by articulating and shaping the predominant intellectual
theology to which Tapping Reeve so faithfully adhered.
The fundamental notions of this Connecticut Orthodoxy were that
man was totally depraved and that God was totally powerful and good.
The statements of these themes would vary. Edwards would insist that
man was sinful because Adam's original sin was imputed to all men, an
Augustinian notion, while Beecher accepted a Taylorist notion that man
was sinful simply because each man sinned. There was a rejection of any
Arminian tendency to argue that man somehow had a role in his own
salvation. Man was depraved; whatever was good came from God, an idea
that Reeve articulated in a letter in 1812 when he spoke of Connecticut
education: "Our hands ought to rise in gratitude [to God] in an especial
manner for the distinguishing pleasure of having our education under the
sunshine of the gospel. ' 37 Reeve simply restated Puritan thought that if
all good, including the government, came from God, then any attack on
those "good" things was an attack on Reeve's God and had to be fought.
Reeve believed in a somber, serious appropriation of God, an appropria-
tion that the more charismatic Baptists and Methodists did not share.
The Baptists and Methodists were passionate worshipers similar to the
emotional worshipers during the Great Awakening. Reeve believed that
"[passion, so far as it prevails, destroys reason, and when it gains entire
ascendency over men, it renders them bedlamites." 8
Thus Reeve's conception of God and his understanding of how man
communicated with God drove him away from the religious dissenters
who were a part of the Republican Party. Since the primary political
question of the time was religious liberty and disestablishment, Reeve
and the religious dissenters were squarely at odds. The political questions
directly undermined Connecticut's (and Reeve's) God, government, reli-
gion, and society and it did so precisely because it was not simply politi-
cal, but because it was a theological challenge.
Reeve thus found himself straddling two understandings of religion
between which there was a tension. Anthropologically, liturgically, and
politically there was a wide chasm between Reeve and the religious dis-
senters, a chasm that led him to oppose the idea of accepting religious
31 E. SWANSON, supra note 30, at 24.
" T. REEVE, supra note 35, at 5.
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pluralism. He could therefore be exclusive; he could shun Aaron Burr and
his father and label the Republicans as selfish bedlamites. But the forces
that attacked his religion were also forcing the religion to redefine itself
in populist tendencies. Had there not been a pluralist society challenging
the Congregational Church it is doubtful that a Lyman Beecher could
have sparked a humanitarian movement. Thus Reeve was also a part of a
religion that unconsciously but implicitly was accepting religious diver-
sity. Reeve exemplified that by his humanitarian activities, and through
the method that he brought to jurisprudence.
2) Reeve's Theology in the Legal Field
The single most important aspect of Tapping Reeve's theory of law
was that it was religious. Justice Samuel Church, who would follow Reeve
as Connecticut's Chief Justice in 1847, said that Reeve "loved the law as a
science, and studied it philosophically. He considered it as the practical
application of religious principles to the business affairs of life. He wished
to reduce it to a certain symmetrical system of moral truth."89
What Reeve did was to take his and Connecticut's religious experi-
ence, which was an experience encompassing the totality of life, and give
it a structured, systematic, rational expression. Essentially Reeve was cre-
ating a "scientific jurisprudence" by making the law rationally structured
and, in a sense, objective. The law was not objective because it was politi-
cally or cosmologically neutral-an impossible status-but because it
reached a centrality of consensus among Connecticut's new diversity.
While the Connecticut religious landscape was no longer simply Congre-
gational, and while the Enlightenment had stimulated Arminianism, all of
the denominations were still Calvinist. Reeve basically introduced a Cal-
vinist, systematic jurisprudence, a stage that conformed to Jacques Ellul's
stage three in which the law is rationally articulated and systematically
synthesized as part of an intellectual, political, and jurisprudential the-
ory. In Puritan Connecticut, the judge was trusted because he was the
interpreter of the will of God. Now the judge would be trusted because he
could articulate the reasons for a decision in a logic independent of Con-
gregational orthodox faith.
Reeve introduced "scientific jurisprudence" in three ways. The most dra-
matic was his opening of the Litchfield Law School, the first of its kind in
the nation. There, students underwent a systematic, formal training in
the law. Second, Reeve wrote several of the earliest American legal trea-
tises in which he surveyed the entire field of law, enunciated the gov-
erning principles of the area, and derived applications from the princi-
ples. Finally, he wrote his judicial opinions, a relatively new exercise in
" S. CHURCH, LITCHFIELD COUNTY CENTENNIAL CELEBRATION, 54 (1968).
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American courts. In his opinions, Reeve insisted upon a strict adherence
to the use of proper forms and suits.
Much of Reeve's jurisprudence seems absolutely dull, since there is
nothing that strikes the modern eye as either innovative or excessively
arcane. For instance, in Sacket v. Mead,1° the defendant was the adminis-
trator of an insolvent estate. The creditors had been paid off to the extent
possible and the statute of limitations for their further payment had
run.41 The defendant then showed some other estate property to the
plaintiff who was also a creditor of the estate. 4" Under the applicable stat-
ute, once the statute of limitations had run, the creditors could not re-
ceive further payments unless they could show further estate property. 43
The plaintiff claimed that he had done so, but also claimed that he was
entitled to have his claim fully satisfied to the exclusion of the other
creditors.4 4
Reeve refused to allow the creditor to recover his full payment be-
cause such payment defeated the principle of average.4 5 Reeve found the
principle in the applicable statute and insisted that if any distribution
was made, it had to be made in shares to all the creditors."6 Furthermore,
Reeve would not allow a suit until the commissioners who would have
been appointed to oversee the administration of an insolvent estate had
met to strike this particular estate average.47 Reeve said that the plaintiff
could maintain a suit on the defendant's probate bond, and then the pro-
ceeds of the bond would be distributed fairly to the creditors. 8
In his adjudication of Sacket, Reeve relied on the principle of aver-
age, on the necessity to bring a suit on the defendant's probate bond in-
stead of a suit against the estate for prompt distribution, and on the tra-
dition of deferring to the legislature. None of this was scriptural, nor was
it innovative; all was a continuation of the Puritan past. Because it was
an open and logical presentation of the past, however, it was socially ac-
ceptable. Reeve was far too committed to his Puritan past, liturgically
and legally, to alter that past. The method he chose to articulate the past,
through humanitarian activity and scientific jurisprudence was a method
broader than used in the past. A hint to the humanitarian aspect of
Reeve comes through in Grumon v. Raymond.49
40 1 Conn. 13 (1814).
4 Id. at 16.
42 Id.
" Id. at 15 n.a.
44 Id. at 16.
" Id. at 22.
46 Id.
41 Id. at 28.
48 Id. at 30.
' 1 Conn. 39 (1814).
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. In Grumon, the justice of the peace of Fairfield County issued a
search warrant for stolen goods. The warrant authorized the sheriff to
"search .. .suspected places, houses, stores or barns in said (town of)
Wilton ... ."5 Sheriff Betts falsely arrested Grumon and four others."
Grumon sued for trespass vi et armis. 2 The defendant justice of the
peace argued that he was immune from suit since he was acting in his
judicial capacity. 8 He also argued that while he might have erred in his
issuance of the warrant, it was not an irregular process." The justice fur-
ther contended that the only person that was actually liable was the per-
son who made the arrest, the sheriff."
The court held that the justice of the peace was liable for the issu-
ance of a general warrant."6 Reeve said that there were several requisites
for a proper search warrant, among them being that the stolen articles
were in a specific place."' Reeve concluded that a justice was not liable if
he issued a warrant that was recognized but was invalid because of some
mistake," however when a judge issued a warrant that the law did not
recognize, as was the case in Grumon, then the justice was potentially
liable."
Besides imposing a burden of care on justices of the peace, thereby
making them subservient to the processes of the law, the Grumon opinion
respects the individual. An individual could not be subjected to harass-
ment from governmental officials because the individual himself was wor-
thy of protection. The restraint of governmental power was not depen-
dent upon revivalist humanitarianism for its existence. Puritan
Connecticut would probably have nodded its approval of Reeve's reason-
ing and result. But the fact that the reasoning was now publicly articu-
lated in written form broadened its acceptance beyond Puritan bounda-
ries. Reeve consistently followed his Grumon and Sacket approach of
presenting Puritan law through broader methodology.
In Reeve's The Law of Baron and Femme," he again revealed the
importance of his Puritan past. In stating that "few maxims of our law
are more important, than that of stare decisis," 6' Reeve showed his ven-
Id. at 40.
51 Id. at 41.
52 Id. at 39.
" Id. at 41.
54 Id.
" Id. at 42.
" Id. at 44.
57 Id. at 45.
" Id. at 44.
69 See id. at 45.
60 T. REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME (1816).
61 Id. at 33.
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eration of the past. For Reeve, the past entailed no separation of law from
religion. His treatise shows this intertwining more explicitly than his
opinions. For instance, Reeve said that parents had the duty to provide
"instruction of them [children] in reading their own language, so as to be
able . . .to search the scripture . . .and . . . learn the revealed will of
God." 62 This instruction was necessary to teach the children the capital
offenses of the state. Reeve discerned that it was part of the law to teach
children to learn scripture, and scripture was necessary to understand the
law. Understanding the Bible was also important in discerning Connecti-
cut matrimonial law, since "all marriages forbidden by God's law or
within the Levitical degrees of kindred are invalid." 3
Reeve did not view theology and law as distinct principles. He was
primarily interested in articulating them consonant with his religious/le-
gal moorings. However, his way of life had already begun to move away
from the Puritan orthodoxy because of the new religious pluralism. Thus,
the method Reeve used to live out his theology was a method that had
interdenominational appeal both in religious humanitarian endeavors and
in legal scientific jurisprudence. Tapping Reeve had simply grown with
his religious environment.
B. Zephania Swift
Zephania Swift was probably the most influential person in Connecti-
cut law. He wrote the first legal treatises in the United States that were
enormously influential even outside the United States. While in the
United States House of Representatives, he wrote his first treatise, A Sys-
tem of The Laws of the State of Connecticut. 64 In 1810, he wrote his
Digest of the Laws of Evidence.6 He was appointed to the Supreme
Court and was thereafter elected to Chief Justice, replacing Tapping
Reeve. After retiring from the Supreme Court, Swift wrote his Digest of
the Laws of Connecticut." He died in 1823.67
Swift rationally systematized everything. Theologically, he insisted
upon a rational deism free from ecclesiastical rigidity, open to religious
pluralism, and based upon a very structured, ordered universe. Jurispru-
dentially, he also stressed finding central principles and a systematic ap-
plication of those principles.
82 Id. at 286-287.
e Id. at 202.
4 Z. SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT (1795).
' Z. SWIFT, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES (1810).
Z. SWIFT, DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF CONNECTICUT (1815).
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1) Swift's Way of Life
In sketching Tapping Reeve's life, it was most convenient to first ap-
preciate Reeve's deed and then proceed to his stated thoughts concerning
religion. The crux of Reeve's theology was in his actions. The crux of
Swift's theology was in his words, a statement which in no way is
designed to disparage his religion. Swift simply took the time to detail his
theology publicly. The logical starting point for Swift, therefore, is his
expressed theology.
Swift's theology was less rigid than Reeve's. Reeve basically em-
braced Puritan theology as modified by the revivals. Swift's theology was
also shaped by the revivals' humanitarian spirit, but was strongly shaped
by the rationalism of the Enlightenment as well. These twin influences
shaped Swift into a deist, but a deist who refuted the ideas of many con-
temporary deists such as Thomas Paine. Interestingly, Swift's theology
bore a character remarkably similar to the theology of John Calvin. Swift
said that he was a follower of Christ and was "desirous only to strip his
gospel of the conventional additions of ecclesiasticism, and show it divine
in form, as it originally stood." 8
Opposing some contemporary rationalists, Swift first established that
there indeed was a God. Swift felt that any rational person had to believe
in God: "[t]he being of God is so universally impressed on the human
mind, that it seems unnecessary to guard against a denial of it by human
laws. Atheism is too cold and comfortless to be a subject of popular be-
lief." 9 Swift's language is similar to Calvin's reasoning for the knowledge
of God. Calvin stated that:
[tihere exists in the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, some
sense of Deity, we hold to be beyond dispute, since God himself, to prevent
any man from pretending ignorance, has endued all men with some idea of
his Godhead .... [T]here is no nation so barbarous, no race so brutish, as
not to be imbued with the conviction that there is a God.70
In both statements, there was a strong belief that one believes in God
simply because it was a natural, rational thing for humans to do. The
utility of this basic method of proof of God was that it allowed constant
appeal to reason for ethical and ecclesiastical theory because it was
through reason that humans became aware of God.
Swift rejected the idea of a vindictive God who often was presented
in sermons of "fire and brimstone," but thought of God as "a kind par-
Baldwin, Zephania Swift in William Draper Lewis, ed., 2 GREAT AmEcAN LAWYERS 108
(W. Lewis ed. 1907).
69 2 Z. Swivr, supra note 64 at 322.
7" 1 J. CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 43 (H. Beveridge trans. 1953).
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ent." 71 This description of God rings of Calvin, who said that by ac-
cepting Christ, one of the resulting benefits for Christians was that God
was transformed from a judge into an indulgent father.7 2
Not only did Swift display the idea of a vindictive God, he also dis-
tanced God from everyday life. The most revealing way he did this was
through the name he gave to God. Swift used amorphous terms such as
"Supreme Deity" and "Supreme Character" to name God. His names
were indicative of a deism that recognized God as a creator, but not as a
closely personal God. Swift needed some way to describe the connection
between God and humanity for if he left his theology as it has been de-
scribed so far, humans would have little need to consider an aloof, amor-
phous God. Swift's link was logical reason.
Logical reason structured Swift's cosmology, his scriptural interpreta-
tion, his philosophy of Christianity, and his ethics. Cosmologically, the
world was a rationally structured system. He said that the "Supreme
Deity":
has created innumerable systems of worlds - peopled them with an infinite
variety of inhabitants, and governs by general and immutable laws - that in
universal nature, he has established the best possible system for the general
good ... this world is but a small part of the great plan ... [and] this life is
but a commencement of an existence which shall never end .7
Scripturally, he interpreted the Bible so it was consistent with rea-
son. Swift said that "certainly no construction should be put on the lan-
guage of our Savior, that would make him promulgate a doctrine wholly
inconsistent with reason and justice. 7 4 Swift also said that Christianity
was nothing more than reason and common sense since "[in its uncor-
rupted state, Christianity is unquestionably, not only consistent with, but
founded on the dictates of reason and common sense.' '7 5 He objected to a
church-centered religion and a church centered state. He thought that the
clergy had overstepped its proper role, even beyond the excesses of the
Roman Church.76 He felt that the Congregational Church had assumed
too much power, power which had corrupted Christianity. Thus, Swift
was not a supporter of the religious predominance of the Puritans and
fully accepted Connecticut's religious diversity. He believed that the
practical application of religion was much more important than proofs of
the absolute rightness of any one denomination. Swift's desire for practi-
cal application of religion placed him in step with the humanitarian reviv-
71 Z. Swirt, THE CORRESPONDENTS 130 (1810).
71 2 J. CALVIN supra note 70 at 37.
73 Z. SwiFT, supra note 71, at 129-30.
74 Z. SwiuT, supra note 66, at 24-25.
,5 7 Swivr, supra note 71, at 119.
" Id. at 17.
JURISPRUDENCE
als. For Swift, Christian ethics were based on the example of the Good
Samaritan:
[w]hat doctrine can be more sublime and worthy the divine character of our
Savior, than to teach us the duty to exercise humanity and compassion to
all that are in distress, without regard to sect, religion, or nation. Yet, how
many people may be found among them who call themselves Christians,
who think there is more merit in making one long prayer, than in the noble
exercise of humanity as in the case of the Samaritan.77
Thus, Swift wanted an ethical way that was true to Christianty, but
which transcended denominationalism. He wanted a church that was true
to Christianity and not obsessed with power, prestige, or ultimate pre-
dominance. The way to do this was to use reason, to describe and to in-
terpret scripture, and to understand Christianity itself. His method was
that of a rationalist who accepted religious pluralism and who rejected
Puritan hegemony. It was a method which transcended denominational-
ism. Most of all, it was a method based on the same structured rationality
that Swift would implement in his jurisprudence.
2) Swift's Theology in the Legal Field
a) The Role of the Supreme Court
Given Swift's perspective of rational structure, it is not surprising
that he was insistent upon the proper understanding of the role of the
Connecticut Supreme Court. In fact, Swift said that the most painful oc-
currence of his life involved a dispute over the definition of the role of the
supreme court. 8 Because it was such an important event, and since it
reveals some of Swift's governmental presuppositions, the story of the Pe-
ter Lung trial is worth relating.
Lung was accused of murdering his wife. The Superior Court was not
in session, so Swift ordered a special court session although he had no
explicit statutory authority to do so. 79 Swift thought that he had to con-
vene the court immediately to prevent witness tampering, because one of
the witnesses was near death, and because he simply desired to conduct a
speedy trial. Lung's counsel did not object to the special court and Lung
was convicted of murder.8 0 The community then felt compassion for
Lung, and his case was appealed to the legislature. The legislature, view-
ing the proceeding as extrajudicial and void, annulled the action of
"' Id. at 125.
78 Z. Swir, VINDICATION OF THE CALLING OF THE SPECIAL SUPERIOR COURT... FOR THE TRIAL
OF PETER LUNG 5 (1816).
" Lung's Case, 1 Conn. 428, 428 (1815).
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Swift's court. 81 Swift said that if he had convened the court improperly,
with a resulting death sentence, that he had committed a criminal act.82
Swift had four arguments against the Assembly's action. He cited a
statute that allowed the Chief Justice to call a special court on "ex-
traordinary circumstances." He appealed to common sense. He claimed
that previous chief justices also had convened a special court. Finally, he
said that Lung did not ask for a new trial, which the legislature gave to
him, but for a pardon.8
Swift gave several reasons why it was a mistake to allow the legisla-
ture to interfere with the judiciary. He first cited the experience of
judges: "judges have formed opinions on the whole science of jurispru-
dence, and heretofore it has been understood that the more law learning a
man had, the better qualified he was to be a judge." 4 He also said the
power assumed by the legislature gave it the discretion to overturn any
court, a power which could be used for evil by corrupt men. The only
restraint on the legislature, moral sentiment, was not enough. Allowing
the legislature to interfere with the judiciary would lead to uncertainty,
endless appeal, and was an invitation to despotism because the legislature
was unrestrained by legal principles and vulnerable to being duped. 5
Instead of allowing ultimate appeal to the legislature, Swift thought
that "the tribunal of dernier resort should be composed of men qualified
by their integrity, talents, science, and experience ... and should be ren-
dered independent of popular whim and clamour." 86 Swift said that judi-
cial independence was "essential to the due and impartial administration
of justice. '87
The Peter Lung controversy revealed Swift's concern for having care-
fully defined governmental function, but it more deeply revealed some
preconceptions that were not historically valid. Swift's complaint of legis-
lative interference in judicial functioning assumed that the legislative and
judicial branches were separate and ignored the fact that the Fundamen-
tal Orders made them indivisible. Because the legislature had delegated
judicial authority to the court, the supreme court had developed an image
of itself as the court of last appeal, an image which correlated with the
American Federal system. Swift was not able to implement his theological
and jurisprudential rationalism efficaciously if the court was not properly
structured as independent, but that independence was not envisioned by
83 Z. Swirt, supra note 78, at 4-21.
82 Id. at 22-24.
" Id. at 27-34.
" Id. at 37.
88 Id. at 39-48.
" Id. at 40.
87 Id. at 45.
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the Fundamental Orders.
b) Swift's Theory of the Law in Treatises and Cases
The nature of law was spelled out in Swift's Digest of the Laws of
the State of Connecticut:
The science of the law is grounded on certain first principles of existing in
the nature and fitness of things. These have been introduced by the statutes
of the legislature, or have been derived from the dictates of reason - from
considerations of policy - from the excellent maxim of civil law, to live vir-
tuously, injure nobody and to render every man his due - and from the sub-
lime precept of Christian morality, to do to others as we would they should
do to us.88
In Swift's system, the world was part of a greater divine, universal
system. Within this world, law was founded on the nature of things and
expressed in several sources. Swift attempted to discover these universal
principles, principles that were religious because of their place in Swift's
cosmology. He then attempted to apply those principles to the particular
circumstances of the case.
Chapman v. Gillet"' and Fox v. Abel" display the explicit interrela-
tionship between religion and law in Swift's Connecticut. In Chapman,
Chapman had given testimony before a meeting of a Presbyterian
Church.9' Gillet charged that Chapman had committed perjury.92 Chap-
man sued Gillet for defamation of character and claimed that the words
charging perjury were themselves actionable.98 Chapman's oath had been
administered by a justice of the peace.
Swift held that the words were actionable because alleging a perjury
at a church meeting was the same as alleging a perjury at any other judi-
cial forum. 4 Swift stated that ecclesiastical tribunals were "necessary, not
only for the promotion of religion, but for the peace and well-being of...
society." 9 Ecclesiastical tribunals "may be said to be courts where justice
is judicially administered."' 6 Swift said that to find justice, a tribunal
must be empowered to administer an oath, and then he extended the
rules of actionable slander to include ecclesiastical tribunals: "[iut has
been decided in this Court, that to charge a man with perjury before arbi-
Z. Swiwr, supra note 66, at 10.
8 2 Conn. 40 (1816).
" 2 Conn. 541 (1818).
2 Conn. at 41.
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trators, is actionable slander; and now by analogy, we extend the same
principle to ecclesiastical tribunals. '97
For a man who excoriated the influence of the church in government,
such a broad extension of authority to an ecclesiastical body is curious.
While Swift did not want a clergy-dominated state, he was apparently
willing and anxious to have the churches share in the administration of
government. If he had wanted religion completely out of government, it
would have been quite easy for him to refuse to extend the rule of action-
able slander, but his opinions reveal unwillingness to separate Christian-
ity from government. In the first sentence of the Chapman opinion, he
declared, "Christianity is a part of the law of the land."98
Swift wanted a continuation of the past, and thus sanctioned reli-
gious tribunals. But the approach he used was systematic law. He kept
law in its Christian context, but pushed the methodology toward Ellul's
stage three in which jurists attempt to systematize the law.
In Fox, the court was called upon to determine the length of the Sab-
bath.99 The Constable (Abel) arrested Fox on the morning of a Sunday,
but before dawn.100 A statute prohibited arrests on Sunday. Fox sued
Abel for trespass vi et armis,1' 1 compelling the court to decide what time
period was meant by "Sabbath.' ' 0
Many of the judges wrote opinions on the issue. Swift thought that
the Sabbath included more than the solar day, which would enable Fox to
enforce the statute and sue Abel.103 Swift based his opinion on Black-
stone's Commentaries and English law, which described the contours of a
day generally.' 04 The other justices took a variety of approaches.10 5 Trum-
bull immediately cited Leviticus, Matthew, and Mark. Smith thought
that only the statute should be examined, not scripture, England, or the
common law.106 Brainard based his decision on the Decalogue and Chris-
tianity's interpretation of the statute. 07 Hosmer relied on what he be-
lieved was normal Christian usage.'0 8
Just as Swift objected to theological hairsplitting among churches so
he avoided a religious debate in Fox. Instead of making a Puritan move to
Id. at 45.
I d. at 43.
2 Conn. at 542.
100 Id. 541.
101 See id.
102 Id. at 542.
10 See id.
I' ld. at 542-43.
100 Id. at 545-46.
100 Id. at 553.
107 Id.
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JURISPRUDENCE
appeal to scripture, he appealed to secular treatises. Fox shows that the
same judge who in Chapman incorporated Christianity into law and gov-
ernment insisted upon adjudicating a case on a systematic method. The
methodology had become broader than scriptural interpretation just as
Connecticut religion had become broader than a single denomination.
The interface of religion and law can also be seen in Swift's treat-
ment of crimes against religion. Swift believed that the "Supreme Deity"
was perfectly capable of avenging his holy law without help from the judi-
ciary. Crimes against religion could be punished only when they simulta-
neously offended religion and the "happiness of civil society."' 09 There
was a tension in this philosophy, however, because what offended the
"happiness of civil society" was dependent upon the level of theological
unanimity in the state. Thus punishable crimes such as blasphemy, athe-
ism, polytheism, Unitarianism and profane swearing, were crimes only be-
cause Connecticut was still a religious state. Heresey and Judaism were
not punishable due in large measure to the tolerance of religious
diversity.
This tension is also seen in Swift's consideration of oaths. Swift said
that the oath was based on "a moral obligation to speak the truth, en-
forced by remorse of conscience for violation of it [and] belief in the exis-
tence of God, and future rewards and punishments."'110 Thus, as long as
one recognized obligations of an oath to tell the truth and understood the
transcendental results of the failure to tell the truth, one could be a
witness.
Swift also said that what a person believed and said about an oath
and its underlying bases was not hearsay, but a simple fact. If a person
disbelieved in the transcendental effects of lying, his statements could be
used as facts to undermine his credibility as a witness. But a man could
not be forced to reveal his opinions about God in court.1 '
Swift left the oath question in a quandry. If a person kept his mouth
shut about his beliefs, then his beliefs could not be questioned and he
could be a witness. However, if the witness had made any statement that
showed disbelief in either the obligation to tell the truth or of the tran-
scendental effects of the failure to tell the truth, he could be dismissed.
This was a very restrictive understanding of freedom of speech and reli-
gion. Swift effectively safeguarded religious expression provided it agreed
with his theology. Swift differed from the Puritans only in the degree to
which he allowed religious freedom.
Swift's conception of all religious elements was that of an ordered
reason and that reason was the tool Swift used to shape his life, particu-
Z. SwirT, supra note 64, at 320.
Z. SwIFT, supra note 78, at 47.
.. Id. at 49.
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larly his jurisprudence. His acceptance of diversity and the humanitarian
spirit also led him to an insistence upon Christian ethics devoid of sectar-
ian competition. His entire theology was one which transcended denomi-
nationalism, but which remained Christian.
In taking law toward scientific jurisprudence, Swift went a step be-
yond Reeve. Reeve trusted the religious monopoly of the Congregational-
ist and was more willing to turn to scripture to support his treatise law.
He followed the forces of religious pluralism to emphasize scientific law
and humanitarianism, but he did not fully support diversity. Swift's way
of life fully supported diversity and rationalism, and not coincidentally he
more fully developed his scientific jurisprudence. There was a direct rela-
tionship between the acceptance of pluralism and the development of sci-
entific law. Yet, even Swift was unable to break completely from the nat-
ural law of the past.
After Swift, the Connecticut jurisprudence was delicately poised be-
tween its inherited natural law and its scientific law. While the over-
whelming Christian/Calvinist nature of Connecticut prevented Reeve and
Swift from dissociating religion from law, the pluralism also drove the law
to the unifying scientific jurisprudence. Connecticut law was scientific
within a Calvinist context.
III TOWARD A THEOLOGICAL THEORY OF JURISPRUDENCE
Every human activity is a reflection of the person's orientation. From
the routine to the abstract, each act rests upon an enormous number of
assumptions that have been internalized by society and the individual.
Lawmaking is not different and therefore much of jurisprudence can be
enlightened by understanding the assumptions and philosophies upon
which the judge's orientation was based.
This Article has attempted to understand the assumptions and phi-
losophies of Connecticut law by focusing on two Supreme Court justices,
Tapping Reeve and Zephania Swift. Both adjudicated in a climate of
transition from monolithic Puritanism to pluralistic Calvinism. Because
of the religious tensions of the day, they sought to bring a legitimate
method of dispute resolution to the court. For both men, that method
was scientific jurisprudence, which itself was centered on man's ability to
reason, which was a direct expression of their theologies. The transforma-
tion of Connecticut law was reflective of, and dependent upon, the reli-
gious developments of pluralism, rationalism, and humanitarianism in
Connecticut society.
The ability of religion to be an effective tool for understanding juris-
prudence raises a host of opportunities for legal and religious scholarship.
What effect did religious diversity have on the legal actions of other
states? How have our definitions of religion been limited by too conven-
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ient distinctions? How did economics affect religion, and what way did
they combine to affect jurisprudence? These are but a tiny few of the
potential avenues for discussion.
In developing this method, scholars should not ignore analysis of
lower level judges and legislators, but at the same time, they must take
care not to lump all of those magistrates into stereotypical groups. A
great effort should be made to understand fully the individual judge.
Judges who were not as active in the forefront of theological movements
as Swift and Reeve were, should also be analyzed.
The potential for this area is enormous. Scholars should not fear that
religion and law have nothing to say about each other. Both disciplines
must come to grips with methods of dispute resolution, a reality that is
inevitable based upon assumptions of human existence. To prevent either
discipline from being interpreted by the other is to waste a valuable op-
portunity for each to understand itself. To ignore that the two together
shape jurisprudence is to ignore history and reality.
